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Abstract
We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon non-zero-sum non-cooperative stochas-
tic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics.
First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strat-
egy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special
case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game
converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same
strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms,
spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixa-
tion”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting
dynamics is related to zero-temperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of pos-
sibly infinite volume.
Keywords and phrases : interacting agents, random graphs, stochastic games, zero-
temperature dynamics.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study a class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting
agents that is closely connected with a Glauber-type non-Markovian dynamics on random
graphs. Let us briefly explain the setting and our contributions both from the point of
view of game theory and of physics, referring to the next section for a precise construction
of the model. Our central results are theorems 1, 2 and 3 below.
We consider an infinite number of agents located on the vertices of the two-dimensional
lattice, where each agent is randomly linked with others, and has positive or negative
feelings regarding them. Moreover, each agent is faced with the need of taking decisions
that affect himself and all others to whom he is linked. The objective of each agent is
to take (non-cooperative) decisions that ultimately do not affect him negatively. Under
a specific choice of the payoff function of each player, we shall prove that there exists a
decision policy achieving this goal, and even more, that if each player adopts this strategy
a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is reached.
From the physical point of view, we study a Glauber-type dynamics on a random graph
with the following features: the dynamics is non-Markovian and has long-range interactions,
in the sense that the maximum distance between interacting particles is unbounded. For
such dynamics we prove spatial mixing (hence ergodicity) and fixation. To the best of our
knowledge, these problems are solved here for the first time, even in the simpler case of a
standard Glauber dynamics on random graphs. Problems of dynamics on random graphs
have attracted a lot of attention in recent years (see the monograph [4] for an extensive
overview), as these structures are often more realistic models of several phenomena than
classical deterministic structures (e.g. in network modeling, spread of epidemics, opinion
formation, etc.). For instance, C. Cooper and A. M. Frieze [2] prove the existence of a
critical coupling parameter at which the mixing time for the Swendsen-Wang process on
random graphs of sufficiently high density is exponential in the number of vertices; M. Dyer
and A. Frieze [5] study the rapid mixing (in time) of Glauber dynamics on random graphs
with average degree satisfying a certain condition (see also A. Frieze and V. Juan [8] for
a related result). In J. P. L. Hatchett et al. [10], the authors analyze the dynamics of
finitely connected disordered Ising spin models on random connectivity graph, focusing on
the thermodynamic limit. I. Pe´rez Castillo and N. S. Skantzos [17] study the Hopfield
model on a random graph in scaling regimes with finite average number of connections
per neuron and spin dynamics as in the Little-Hopfield model. On the other hand, as
mentioned above, even though (spatial) mixing is one of the most natural questions to ask
about stochastic models of interacting particle systems, it has not been discussed in the
literature, to the best of our knowledge. It is probably important to recall that mixing
is a key ingredient to obtain further results, such as ergodicity. Moreover, just to cite
another important application, using Stein’s methods (see e.g. [1]), mixing implies the
central limit theorem, which gives qualitative estimates on the number of sites (or agents)
with a positive spin (or opinion) in large regions of the graph.
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We would like to stress that our results on mixing are quite general, and if one is only
interested in the physical aspect of our work, they could essentially skip the part of the
paper which deals with stochastic games, and concentrate only on the physical aspect.
Let us briefly discuss how the model and results of the present paper are related to
the existing literature on using methods of the theory of interacting particle systems in
economic modelling and game theory. One of the first and still most cited works on the
subject is a paper by H. Fo¨llmer [6], who considered a pure exchange economy with (count-
ably) infinitely many agents, each of which having random preferences and endowments.
In particular, agents are located on the vertices of the d-dimensional lattice Zd, and their
preferences can be influenced by all his neighbors (i.e. such that their euclidean distance is
one). The author then considers the problem of existence of a price system stabilizing the
economy. See also E. Nummelin [16] for further results in this connection, but with a finite
number of agents. In U. Horst and J. Scheinkman [12] the authors study a system of social
interactions where agents are located on the nodes of a subset of Zd, and each of them is
provided with a utility function and a set of feasible actions. The behavior of an agent
is assumed to depend on the choices of other agents in a reference group, which can be
random and unbounded. The authors, in analogy to our case, work under the assumption
that the probability of two agents being linked decays with distance, and are concerned
with the existence of equilibrium (in the classical microeconomic sense). U. Horst [11]
determines conditions such that non-zero-sum discounted stochastic games with agents in-
teracting locally and weakly enough have a Nash equilibrium. While the set of feasible
actions in this paper is much richer than in ours, we do not assume to have any knowledge
on the reference group of each agent, apart of being finite almost surely. We only allow
agents to be able to observe the dynamics of a (local) configuration around them. As a
result of the structural differences in the settings, the optimal strategy in [11] is Markovian,
while in our case it can never be Markovian.
In general, the following features of our setting and results could be particularly in-
teresting from a game-theoretic perspective: we consider games where interactions among
agents are not known a priori, and we explicitly construct a strategy that leads the game
to equilibrium, while the typical result of game theory is the existence of equilibrium and
a characterization of optimal strategies at equilibrium.
Let us also briefly recall that several other models of interacting particle systems admit
a natural interpretation in terms of social interaction. Well-known examples are the voter
process (see e.g. T. Liggett [13]), used in models for the formation and spread of opinions,
or the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses (see e.g. section 2.1 in M. Talagrand
[18]). Infinite interacting particle systems have found applications in sociology as well: see,
for instance, T. Liggett and S. Rolles [14] for a model of formation of social networks.
The organization of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe the model so we
show how agents interact and what their aim is; in section 3 a general strategy achieving
the goal of each agent is given, and section 4 proves spatial mixing, hence ergodicity, of the
dynamics, when all agents adopt the same strategy. Finally, using the results on spatial
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mixing and ergodicity, we prove that the game “fixates”, i.e. that agents will adopt a
constant strategy after a finite time. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the fixation of
zero-temperature dynamics (see e.g. E. De Santis and C. M. Newman [3], L. R. Fontes [7],
O. Ha¨ggstro¨m [9], S. Nanda, C. M. Newman and D. L. Stein [15]).
2 Model and problem formulation
Let us first introduce some notation used throughout the paper. We consider the two-
dimensional lattice Z2 with sites x = (x1, x2) and distance d defined by
d(x, y) = |x1 − y1|+ |x2 − y2|. (1)
The cardinality of a subset Γ ⊆ Z2 is denoted by |Γ|. We denote by ΛM the set of all
x ∈ Z2 such that d(O,x) ≤ M , with O = (0, 0). If x ∈ Z2, ΛM (x) stands for ΛM + x.
Our configuration space is S = {−1,+1}Z2 . The single spin space {−1,+1} is endowed
with the discrete topology, and S with the corresponding product topology. Given η ∈ S,
or equivalently η : Z2 → {−1,+1}, and Λ ⊆ Z2, we denote by ηΛ the restriction of η
to Λ. Given a graph G = (V,E), where V and E are the sets of its vertices and edges,
respectively, we shall denote by {x, y} an element of E connecting x, y ∈ V . For any
x ∈ V , we shall denote by ρx the distance of the longest edge having x as endpoint, namely
we define
ρx = sup
y: {x,y}∈E
d(x, y).
Recall that the distance in variation of two probability measures µ and ν on a discrete set
Ω is defined as
‖µ− ν‖ = 1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
|µ(ω)− ν(ω)|.
We shall now introduce an idealized model of a large ensemble of interacting individuals.
The ingredients will be a random graph, a function on its edges (specifying an environment,
roughly speaking), and a stochastic process with values in S describing the time evolution
of the system.
Let G = (V,E) be a random graph, whose set of vertices V is given by all sites of the
2-dimensional lattice Z2, and whose set of edges E satisfy the following conditions: edges
exist with probability one between each site x and all y such that d(x, y) = 1, and
P(|{y : {x, y} ∈ E}| <∞) = 1 ∀x ∈ V. (2)
We suppose that each site is occupied by an individual (we shall often identify individuals
with the sites they occupy, when no confusion will arise), and that relations among individ-
uals are modeled by the edges of G and by a function j : V × V → {−1, 0,+1}; j(x, y) = 0
if {x, y} /∈ E, otherwise j(x, y) ∈ {−1,+1}.
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In particular, we shall say that individuals x and y are linked if {x, y} ∈ E, and the
value j(x, y) shall account for the “feelings” of x towards y: we set j(x, y) = +1 if x is a
“friend” of y, and j(x, y) = −1 if x is an “enemy” of y. We do not assume symmetry of
j, i.e. friendship of an individual towards another may not be reciprocal. Moreover, we
assume that individuals do not know with whom they are connected, nor whether these
individuals are friends or enemies. Note also that in this model x can be friend of y, y friend
of z, but x and z can be either friends or enemies (a phenomenon also called frustration in
physics).
Let us now introduce a stochastic process σ : [0,∞) → S modelling the evolution of
the “action” (or opinion) of the individuals. We shall use a graphical construction of the
process, which provides a specific version of basic coupling, i.e. it provides versions of the
whole family of stochastic processes on G (or on any finite subset of it), all on the same
probability space. We assume that the initial configuration σ0 is chosen from a symmetric
Bernoulli product measure. Moreover, the continuous-time dynamics of σt is given by
independent Poisson processes (with rate 1) at each site x ∈ V corresponding to those
times (tx,n)n∈N when the individual x is asked to update his opinion. Before describing the
set of feasible ways of opinion updating, let us introduce a reward for a generic individual
x at time tx,n, as a result of his action:
ht(x) = sgn

 ∑
y: {x,y}∈E
j(x, y)σt(x)σt(y)

 ,
where we have set, for simplicity, t ≡ tx,n.
We allow x to base his decision on the history of σΞs(s), s ≥ 0, and h(x), where Ξs
are finite balls centered in x with random radius which is nondecreasing with respect to s,
finite almost surely for all s ≥ 0, and not ’exploding’. Formally, the decision of individual
x at time tx,n is a {−1,+1}-valued random variable ux,n measurable with respect to the σ-
algebra generated by {σΞs(s), s ≤ tx,n} and {hs(x), s ≤ tx,n}, where Ξs are balls centered
in x such that
Ξ∞ = lim
s→∞
Ξs
exists and is finite with probability one. We shall denote by Ext the filtration just defined.
The dynamics of σ is then completely specified by the updating rule
σtx,n(x) = ux,n.
Several remarks are in order: the reward ht(x) obtained by individual x as a result of his
decision at time t = tx,n is positive if the difference between pleased and damaged friends is
bigger than the difference between pleased and damaged enemies, negative if the opposite
happens, and zero if the value is the same. Since at a fixed arrival time t = tx,n of the
Poisson clock of x no other clock is ringing, i.e. P(ty,m = t) = 0 for all y 6= x and for all
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m ∈ N, the dynamics of σ is well-defined (also using the graphical construction). Finally,
at any positive time t, σt(x) represents the last decision taken by individual x up to time
t.
We formulate the following problem for the generic individual x: find a strategy pix =
(ux,1, ux,2, . . .) such that
ht(x) ≥ 0 a.s.
for all t ≥ Tx, where Tx is a finite (random) time.
Remark 1. We built the random graph G on the two-dimensional lattice Z2 to give a
“geographic” dimension to the problem and to have a simple notion of distance on the
graph. However, all results in the next section still hold replacing Z2 with any higher
dimensional lattice Zd, d ≥ 3. We shall see below that choosing d = 2 also affects a
constant appearing in an assumption used to prove spatial mixing.
3 Admissible strategies that eliminate losses
In this section we construct explicitly a strategy pix for the generic individual x that asymp-
totically eliminate negative rewards, i.e. such that P(ht(x) ≥ 0) = 1 for all t greater than
a random time, which is finite with probability one. It will also be clear that this strategy
is non-cooperative, that is pix eventually eliminate negative rewards irrespectively of the
strategies adopted by all other individuals.
For simplicity of notation let us describe the strategy pi ≡ pi0 for the individual located
at the origin O. The arrival times of his Poisson process and the corresponding decisions
and rewards will be denoted by tn, un, and hn, n ∈ N, respectively.
The strategy pi = (u1, u2, . . .) is best defined algorithmically through a decision tree.
We also need an additional “data structure”, i.e. a collection R of ordered triples of the
type (η, u, h), where η ∈ S is supported on finite balls, u ∈ {−1,+1}, and h ∈ {−1, 0,+1}.
At the first arrival time t1, u1 is chosen accordingly to a Bernoulli law with parameter
1/2 (a “fair coin toss”), and (σΛ1 , u1, h1) is added to R.
The description of the algorithm then follows inductively: at time tn+1, let ΛMn be the
support of the last configuration added to R. Let σ′ := σΛMn (tn+1−) and check whether
there exists (σ′, u′, h′) ∈ R.
• If yes, set
un+1 = u
′ h
′
|h′| ,
with the convention 0/|0| := 1. The reward hn+1 corresponding to un+1 is now
obtained.
– If hn+1 ≥ 0, no further action is needed.
– If hn+1 < 0, then add to R the triplet (σΛMn+1 , un+1, hn+1).
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• Otherwise, set un+1 = un, and add to R the triplet (σ′, un+1, hn+1).
The above algorithm formalizes the following heuristic procedure: the agent starts looking
at the configuration on the smallest ball centered around him and plays tossing a coin.
The next time his clock rings, he checks whether he has already seen such a configuration.
If it is a new one, he will again memorize it and play by tossing a coin, while if it is a
known one he will play as he did before if he got a positive reward, or the opposite way if
he got a negative reward. Of course it could happen that this way of playing still does not
guarantee a positive reward, in which case he will memorize the configuration on a larger
ball around himself and its associated outcome.
Remark 2. One of the key steps of the algorithm requires one to look for a triplet (σ′, u′, h′)
in R, given σ′ = σΛ, for a certain Λ ⊂ Z2. This operation is uniquely determined, i.e. there
can exist only one triplet (σ′, u′, h′) ∈ R with a given σ′. This can be seen as a consequence
of the structure of the algorithm itself. Namely, as soon as the player “observes” the same
configuration σ′ = σΛ with a different associated outcome h, he will immediately enlarge
the support of observed configurations Λ.
We shall now prove that the strategy just defined eliminates losses for large times.
Theorem 1. For any individual x there exists a random time Tx, finite with probability
one, such that
P
(
ht∨Tx(x) ≥ 0
)
= 1.
Proof. Let us define a sequence of random times (τn)n∈N as follows:
τn = inf{n ∈ N | ∃(σ, u, h) ∈ R, suppσ = Λn+1},
with the convention that inf ∅ = +∞. In other words, τn is the first time that individual x
includes into his information setR the box Λn+1 (and if this never happens, then τn = +∞).
Let τk be the last finite element of the sequence (τn)n∈N. By assumption (2) we know that
|{y : {x, y} ∈ E}| is finite, hence k ≤ ρx because ht(x) only depends on those y linked to
x, for all times t. Therefore the biggest Λn observed by the agent in the origin is finite.
Define the family of sets
Ak(t) = {σΛk(tx,ℓ) : tx,ℓ ∈ [τk, t]} .
It clearly holds Ak(t1) ⊆ Ak(t2) for t1 < t2, hence we can define
Ak(∞) = lim
t↑∞
Ak(t).
Since Ak(t) ⊂ {−1,+1}Λk , and Λk is finite, then there exists Tx > 0 such that Ak(Tx) =
Ak(∞), hence
Ak(t) = Ak(∞) ∀t > Tx.
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We claim that hx,n ≥ 0 for all tx,n > Tx. In fact, for every tx,n > Tx there exists (σ, u, h) ∈
R with σ(y) = σtx,n(y) for all y ∈ Λk. But since τk+1 = ∞, the algorithm will give as
output a un such that hn ≥ 0 (to convince oneself it is enough to “run” the algorithm). In
a more suggestive way, one could say that after Tx individual x has already been faced at
least once with all possible configurations that are relevant for him, and therefore knows
how to take the right decision.
Remark 3. (i) Note that the strategies of other individuals never enter into the arguments
used in the proof. Therefore individual x is sure to reach the goal of eliminating losses in
finite time irrespectively of the strategies played by all other individuals.
(ii) However, we would like to stress that the random time Tx is not a stopping time
(i.e. it is not adapted to the filtration Ext ). In fact, Tx depends in general on the decisions
of other individuals, whose policies are not necessarily adapted to Ext . In general, even if
all policies were adapted, the random times {Tx}x∈Z2 would not be stopping times.
(iii) Let us also observe that although we formally allowed the strategy pix to be adapted
to Ext , the information used by the strategy constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 is
much smaller. Similarly, one could refine the way the memory structure R is constructed,
for instance by eliminating configurations on smaller balls, when one starts to add new
configurations on balls of higher radius. However, we preferred to keep the construction of
R as it is to avoid non-essential complications.
As a consequence of theorem 1 and of observation (i) in the above remark, one has
the following result, which essentially states that the games admits an “asymptotic” Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Let M ∈ N and assume that each player x ∈ ΛM := [−M,M ]× [−M,M ]
adopts the strategy pix defined above. Then there exists a finite random time TM after which
no agent can gain by any change in their strategy given the strategies currently pursued by
other players.
It is important to observe that in the above proposition we implicitly assume that
each player only cares about “not loosing”, or equivalently he distinguishes only between
“loosing” (ht(x) < 0) and “not loosing” (ht(x) ≥ 0). In this sense, after TM , there is no
point for any player x ∈ ΛM to change his strategy, as proved in theorem 1. The statement
of the proposition is in general false if the player distinguishes between ht(x) > 0, ht(x) = 0,
and ht(x) < 0.
We think that one can prove (and we leave it as a conjecture), that this asymptotic
equilibrium is not Pareto. This could be done adapting ideas of O. Ha¨ggstro¨m [9], who
proved that zero-temperature dynamics on a random graph does not reach the minimum
energy configuration.
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4 Spatial mixing and ergodicity
The main result of this section, which plays an essential role in the results about fixation
of the next section, is that a spatial mixing property holds. We shall work under the
following hypothesis, which states that the probability of two agents being linked decays
algebraically with their distance.
Standing assumption. It holds that
P({x, y} ∈ E) ≤ C
d(x, y)9
, (3)
for all y such that d(x, y) > 1, where C is a positive constant.
Note that assumption (3) implies (2). Moreover, the exponent appearing on the right-hand
side of (3) depends on the dimension of the lattice and it is needed in order to use well-
known combinatorial estimates on path counting in Z2 in the proofs to follow. However,
it would not be difficult to generalize our arguments to any higher dimensional lattice Zd,
d ≥ 3, at the expense of replacing the exponent 9 with a (higher) constant depending on
the dimension d, and of using more complicated estimates in the proofs. Since this point
is not essential and would only add technical complications, we preferred to fix d = 2.
Before stating the main theorem of this section, we need to introduce the following set
of conditions.
Hypothesis H. The random graph G = (V,E) and the process σ : [0,∞) → {−1, 1}Z2 ,
satisfy the following conditions:
(i) For each vertex x ∈ Z2 there exists a Poisson process Px, and the Poisson processes
{Px}x∈Z2 are mutually independent. Denoting by Υx = {tx,n} the set of arrival times
of Px, the value of σt(x) is allowed to change only at times t ∈ Υx.
(ii) Given any couple (x, y) ∈ Z2 × Z2, the probability P({x, y} ∈ E) is defined and it
can depend on d(x, y). Moreover, for any choice of (x, y), (v,w) ∈ Z2 × Z2 with
(x, y) 6= (v,w), the events {x, y} ∈ E and {v,w} ∈ E are mutually independent.
(iii) The evolution of the process is local, i.e. σtx,n(x) is measurable with respect to F
x
tx,n,
where Fxt denotes the σ-algebra generated by {σs(y) : {x, y} ∈ E or y = x, s < t}.
We denote by FVt the σ-algebra generated by ∪x∈V Fxt .
(iv) Both the probability of two agents being linked and the evolution of σ are translation
invariant, i.e. P({x, y} ∈ E) = P({x+ v, y+ v} ∈ E) and P(σt ∈ A|σ0 = η) = P(σt ∈
A+ v|σ0(·) = η(·+ v)).
We can now state the main theorem of this section.
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Theorem 2. If Hypothesis H holds true, then σ satisfies the spatial mixing property
lim
Λ→Z2
P
(
σΛ0(t) = η|FΛ
c
t
)
= P(σΛ0(t) = η), (4)
where Λ0 is any finite region in Z
2.
Note that the process σ is translation invariant if each agent adopts the same strategy
at each decision time (the strategy does not need to be the one defined in section 3). Before
giving the proof of the theorem, we establish some auxiliary results.
We shall use the following terminology: by “box of side length L” we mean the set
[−L/2, L/2]2 ⊂ Z2. For ρ < 1, we call “subbox of side length Lρ” any one of the L1−ρ
square sets into which a box of side length L can be subdivided. We always assume Lρ,
L1−ρ ∈ N (without loss of generality, as it will be clear). Furthermore, we shall say that
two subboxes R and S are “neighbors” if d(R,S) ≤ √2, so every subbox has 8 neighbor
subboxes. We shall call “path of subboxes” a sequence of subboxes (Rk)k=1,...,K such that
Rk and Rk+1 are neighbors for each k = 1, . . . ,K − 1. Two subboxes R, S are “linked” if
there exist x ∈ R, y ∈ S such that {x, y} ∈ E.
In the following lemma we introduce a sequence of boxes increasing to Z2, each of one
further subdivided into a variable number of boxes also increasing to Z2, but at a lower
rate.
Lemma 1. There exist a sequence of integer numbers Ln ↑ +∞, a sequence of square boxes
QLn of side length Ln, each of them partitioned into subboxes of side L
ρ
n, ρ = 13/42, such
that only a finite number of the boxes QLn will contain linked non-neighbor subboxes.
Proof. We use a Borel-Cantelli argument on a suitable sequence of box side lengths Ln. In
particular, let L be a positive integer, QL a square of side L, subdivided into subboxes of
side Lρ. The probability of an agent x to be linked with some other agent of a non-neighbor
subbox is bounded by
∑
y:d(x,y)≥Lρ
C
d(x, y)9
≤ C1
∫ ∞
Lρ
1
v9
2piv dv = C2
1
L7ρ
,
where C, C1, C2 are positive constants. Therefore two agents in non-neighbor subboxes
exist with probability not larger than
L2
∑
y:d(x,y)≥Lρ
C
d(x, y)9
≤ C2 1
L7ρ−2
→ 0, as L→∞.
Taking now a subsequence Ln growing to infinity rapidly enough,∑
P(ALn) <∞,
where ALn denotes the event that QLn contains linked non-neighbor subboxes. By Borel-
Cantelli lemma, only a finite number of occurrences of ALn can happen, which finishes the
proof.
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Recall that for a sequence of i.i.d. standard exponential random variables {Xi} one has
P
( n∑
i=1
Xi < nα
)
≤ e−Φ(α)n ∀α < EX1, (5)
where the so-called rate function Φ is given by
Φ(α) = α− 1− log α.
Proof of Theorem 2. We use a coupling argument to show that
sup
ζ′,ζ′′
∣∣P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ ′)− P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ ′′)∣∣→ 0 (6)
and hence, by the inequality
sup
ζ′,ζ′′
∣∣P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ ′)− P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ ′′)∣∣
≥ |P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ)− P(σΛ0(t) = η)| ∀ζ,
that (4) holds.
We construct two coupled systems σ′, σ′′ on the same probability space supporting σ in
the following way: σ′x(0) = σ
′′
x(0) = σx(0) for all x ∈ Λ; σ′ and σ′′ update their state
according to the same translation-invariant rule of σ; all other randomness in the system
(the random graph, the Poisson processes, the “coin tosses” needed for the decision rules)
coincide. Define, for any x ∈ V , the random time
τx = inf{t ≥ 0 : σ′x(t) 6= σ′′x(t)},
and introduce the process
[0,∞) × V ∋ (t, x) 7→ νx(t) = 1(t ≥ τx) ∈ {0, 1}.
Using a pictorial language, we shall say that we color x with black as soon as the two
processes σ′ and σ′′ differ at x. Let us also introduce another process ν˜ : [0,∞)×V → {0, 1}
with the property ν˜x(t) ≥ νx(t) a.s. for all x and all t. The dynamics of ν˜ is specified as
follows: ν˜x(0) = 0 for all x ∈ V , and ν˜x can turn to one as a consequence of two classes of
events. In particular, (i) ν˜x(t) = 1 if there exists x
′ belonging to the same subbox of x such
that νx′(t) = 1, and (ii) ν˜x(τ) = 1 if there exists y belonging to a neighbor subbox such
that ν˜y(τ) = 1, where τ is any arrival time of the Poisson process relative to x. Moreover,
we assume that 1 is an absorbing state for ν˜x, for all x. Using again a pictorial analogy,
we could say that the black area generated by ν˜ is bigger than the black area generated
by ν. In particular, as soon as a site x turns black, (i) implies that the whole subbox to
which it belongs becomes black as well.
11
By Lemma 1, there exists a positive integer N and a sequence Ln such that for all n > N
the boxes QLn contain no linked non-neighbor subboxes. The shortest path of subboxes
from the boundary of the box QLn to its center has length L
1−ρ
n /2 (therefore, for n large
enough, the shortest path of subboxes from the boundary of the box QLn to Λ0 has length
greater or equal than L1−ρn /2 − 1). Setting TQLρ = infx∈QLρ tx,1 (recall that tx,1 is the
first arrival time of the Poisson processes relative to x), one has that the distribution of
TQLρ is Exp(L
2ρ), where Exp(λ) stands for the law of an exponential random variable with
parameter λ. The minimum time for the formation of a path of k “black” subboxes along
a fixed path (of sites) from the boundary of QLn to the origin is given by
T =
k∑
i=1
Ti
for all n > N (from now we shall tacitly assume n > N), where T1, . . . , Tk are i.i.d.
exponential random variables with parameter L2ρn (independence and the value L
2ρ
n follow
by the memoryless property of the exponential distribution).
Note that the sequence of subboxes in a path turning black does not influence the
minimum time needed for the formation of such path, which is a sum of independent
exponential random variables of parameter L2ρn , using again the memoryless property of
exponential distributions. It follows by (5) that, for 0 < α < 1, one has
P(T ≤ kαL−2ρn ) ≤ e−(α−1−log α)k.
Denoting by T∂QLn→O the (random) time needed to form a path of black subboxes from
the boundary of QLn to the origin O, we obtain the estimate
P
(
T∂QLn→O ≤
α
2
L1−3ρn
)
≤ 4L1−ρn
∑
k≥
L
1−ρ
n
2
8 · 7k−1 exp
(
− (α− 1− log α)k
)
,
hence, for 0 < α < 17e ,
lim
n→∞
P
(
T∂QLn→O ≤
α
2
L1−3ρn
)
= 0.
Here the term 4L1−ρn accounts for the possible initial subbox on the boundary of QL, and
8 · 7k−1 is an upper bound for the number of paths (of subboxes) of length k starting in a
given subbox. We obtain that, as n→∞, the term on the right hand side goes to zero like
e−βL
1−ρ
n (modulo polynomial terms), with β a positive constant. Again by a Borel-Cantelli
argument we obtain
P
(
lim
L→∞
T∂QL→O =∞
)
= 1.
Moreover, the evolution of the central subbox is completely independent on the configura-
tion outside Λ until it turns black, and so the theorem is proved. 
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Remark 4. Although (6) has been proved only for a particular choice of a sequence of
increasing boxes Λn, one can easily show that any increasing sequence of boxes will do. In
fact, the supremum appearing in (6) is decreasing with respect to Λ, hence it is enough to
prove the theorem for any (fixed) subsequence.
5 Fixation
In this section we shall work under the general assumptions introduced in section 2 and 4,
and furthermore we assume that each player adopts the same strategy (hence the dynamics
is translation invariant), and that interactions are symmetric, i.e. that j(x, y) = j(y, x)
for any x, y ∈ V . The latter hypothesis is essential, as it would be possible to find
counterexamples to our results in the case of asymmetric interactions. As before, we shall
denote by x an arbitrary agent, fixed throughout this section. Let us define the random
time Tx as
Tx = sup{t : at time t agent x sees a new configuration or loses}. (7)
As it follows from Theorem 1, Tx is finite with probability one. Moreover, by definition,
agent x will not loose at any time after Tx. Let us also define the random variable Mx as
the number of times agent x changes his state (i.e. updates his opinion) during the time
interval (0,+∞).
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 3. Assume that each agent adopts the strategy constructed in section 3. Then
each agent x ∈ V updates his opinion only a finite number of times, i.e.
P(Mx <∞) = 1.
Before proving theorem 3, we shall need some more definitions and preparatory results.
Let us recall the definition of ρx:
ρx = sup
y: {x,y}∈E
d(x, y), (8)
the distance from x of his farthest connected agent. Note that one has, as follows by the
standing assumption (3),
P(ρx ≥ r) ≤
∑
s≥r
4s
C
s8+ε
≤ K
r6+ε
(9)
where C and K are constants depending on x. Therefore Eρkx, 1 ≤ k ≤ 5 are finite:
Eρkx ≤ 1 +
∞∑
r=2
rkP(ρ = r) ≤ 1 +
∞∑
r=2
rkP(ρ ≥ r) ≤ 1 +
∞∑
r=2
rk
K
r6+ε
<∞. (10)
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Let us also define the energy (or Lyapunov) function on a finite set Λ ⊂ Z2 as
HΛ(σ) = −
∑
u∈Λ
h˜u(σ), (11)
where
h˜u(σ) =
∑
v:{u,v}∈E
j(u, v)σuσv. (12)
In the following we shall denote by Λn the square box [−n, n]× [−n, n].
Lemma 2. There exists a continuous function e : R+ → [−Eρ2,Eρ2] such that
lim
n→∞
HΛn(σ(t))
|Λn| = e(t) a.s. (13)
Proof. By the definitions of h˜x(σ(t)), ρx, it follows that for each time t
−ρ2x ≤ h˜x(σ(t)) ≤ ρ2x,
hence, taking expectations, recalling (10), and using translation invariance
−∞ < −Eρ2O ≤ Eh˜x(σ(t)) ≤ Eρ2O <∞.
At any time t, using the space ergodicity of the system (implied by the spatial mixing
property proved in Theorem 2), we obtain
lim
n→∞
HΛn(σ(t))
|Λn| = Eh˜O(σ(t)) a.s. (14)
Setting e(t) = Eh˜O(σ(t)), we just have to prove that e is continuous. Using again the
spatial ergodicity of σ, the proportion of agents in Λn taking at least a decision in the time
interval ]t1, t2[ tends to 1 − e−(t2−t1) ≤ t2 − t1 as n → ∞. Since each agent is endowed
with a Poisson process that is independent from all other processes and random variables
describing the dynamics of the system, the mean energy variation of each agent is bounded
by Eρ2. Therefore we also have
|e(t2)− e(t1)| = lim
n→∞
|HΛn(σ(t2))−HΛn(σ(t1))|
|Λn|
≤ (1− e−(t2−t1))Eρ2 ≤ (t2 − t1)Eρ2,
(15)
i.e. the function e is Lipschitz continuous.
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Let us now define the following discrete random sets for agent x, which are subsets of
the set of arrival times of his Poisson process:
N1(x) = {t : t ≤ Tx, the agent in x sees a known configuration at time t and loses}
N2(x) = {t : t ≤ Tx, there is an arrival of the Poisson process in x} \N1(x)
N3(x) = {t : t > Tx, the agent in x changes opinion}
Note that by definition of Tx, at any time t > Tx agent x can only see known configurations,
and can only win.
We also define, for every t > 0 and x ∈ Z2, the random sets
Ni(t, x) = Ni(x) ∩ [0, t],
for i = 1, 2, 3.
Moreover, for Λ ⊂ Z2, we set
Ni(t,Λ) =
⋃
x∈Λ
Ni(t, x).
The dynamics of the system and the definition of e(t) imply that e(t) is determined only
by the changes of στ (·), τ ∈ {Ni(t, x)}x∈Z2 , i = 1, 2, 3. We can therefore write
e(t) = e1(t) + e2(t) + e3(t),
where ei(t) denotes the component of e(t) determined by changes of στ (·) for τ ∈ {Ni(t, x)}x∈Z2 .
Moreover one has e2(t) ≤ 0 because we are eliminating the arrivals where the agent lost,
and in this case the energy can only decrease.
We are now in the position to prove the theorem on the fixation of the stochastic
dynamics.
Proof of Theorem 3. In virtue of the translation invariance of the system, it is enough to
prove the result for the agent in the origin. First observe that MO ≤ |N1(O)|+ |N2(O)|+
|N3(O)|, because N1(O) and N2(O) may contain Poisson arrival times in which the agent
O does not change his opinion. Denoting Ni(O) by Ni for simplicity of notation, we shall
prove that |Ni| < ∞ almost surely for i = 1, 2, 3. Let us first observe that the following
inclusion relations hold:
{|N1(O)|+ |N2(O)| =∞} ⊂ {TO =∞} ∪ (
⋃
n≥1
{N1(O) =∞, TO < n}),
and
{|N1(O)|+ |N2(O)| =∞, TO < n} ⊂
{|Arrivals in (0, n) of the Poisson process in the origin| =∞, TO < n}.
15
Recalling that P({TO =∞}) = 0 we obtain
P (|N1(O)|+ |N2(O)| =∞) ≤
∞∑
n=1
P(|Arrivals in (0, n) of the Poisson process in the origin| =∞) = 0.
Thus we only need to show that |N3(O)| is almost surely finite. First we observe that one
has
e1(t) = lim
n→∞
1
|Λn|
∑
τ∈N1(t,Λn)
HΛn(σ(τ)) −HΛn(σ(τ−)) ≤ Eρ3O a.s., (16)
because the number of changes in the origin N1(t, O) is at most ρO (the maximum number
of enlargements of the box observed by the agent x), and in any change the energy can
increase at most by ρ2O. Finally, the spatial ergodicity yields the almost sure upper bound
in (16).
At any time τ ∈ N3 the energy HΛ(σ(t)) decreases at least of one unit, i.e. HΛ(σ(t)) ≤
HΛ(σ(t
−))− 1, otherwise the agent does not change opinion. Thus
e3(t) = lim
n→∞
1
|Λn|
∑
τ∈N3(t,Λn)
HΛn(σ(τ)) −HΛn(σ(τ−))
≤ lim
n→∞
−|N3(t,Λn)|
|Λn| = −E|N3(t, O)|,
(17)
where we have used once more the spatial ergodicity.
By Lemma 2 and noting that the energy is initially zero (because agents choose +1 or
−1 with probability 1/2), one has the following inequality
−Eρ2 ≤ e(t) = e1(t) + e2(t) + e3(t) ≤ e1(t) + e3(t),
which holds uniformly in time t. Using inequalities (16) and (17) we obtain E|N3(t, O)| ≤
Eρ3O + Eρ
2
O ≤ ∞ uniformly in t, hence also in the limit as t → ∞. But E|N3(O)| < ∞
obviously implies |N3(O)| < ∞ a.s., so we have shown that MO ≤ |N1(O)| + |N2(O)| +
|N3(O)| <∞ and the proof is complete. 
Remark 5. We can also deduce, following the proof of Theorem 3, that
P (N3 > C) ≤ E(ρ
2
O) + E(ρ
3
O)
C
,
as an immediate consequence of Markov’s inequality.
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Remark 6. Let us briefly comment on the connection between the fixation result just
proved and the results of De Santis and Newman [3]. The improvement is twofold: namely,
the dynamics considered here does not coincide (locally) with zero-temperature dynamics.
It is immediate to prove that at any given time there is at least an agent which does
not follow the zero-temperature dynamics. This implies that on any time interval the zero-
temperature dynamics and our dynamics are almost surely different. Our could say, perhaps
somewhat informally, that our dynamics is a perturbation of zero-temperature dynamics
with the property of preserving fixation. Moreover, as already mentioned several times,
our dynamics is non-Markovian, while the arguments used in [3] hold only for Markovian
dynamics.
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